Amy, Douglas J. 2000. Behind the Ballot Box: A Citizen’s Guide to Voting Systems. Westport, CT: Praeger.
Amy, Douglas J. 2002. Real Choices/New Voices: How Proportional Representation Elections Could Revitalize American Democracy. 2nd ed. New York: Columbia University Press.
Bowler, Shaun, and Todd Donovan. 1998. Demanding Choices: Opinion, Voting, and Direct Democracy. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
Bowler, Shaun, Todd Donovan, and Trudi Happ. 1992. “Ballot Propositions and Information Costs: Direct Democracy and the Fatigued Voter.” The Western Political Quarterly 45 (2): 559-568.
Cain, Bruce E., and Kenneth P. Miller. 2001. “The Populist Legacy: Initiatives and the Undermining of Representative Government.” In Dangerous Democracy? The Battle over Ballot Initiatives in America, eds. Larry J. Sabato, Howard R. Ernst and Bruce A. Larson. New York: Rowman & Littlefield.
California Democratic Party. 2010. “By-laws and Rules of the California Democratic Party.” http://www.cadem.org/admin/miscdocs/files/CDP-BY-LAWS.pdf (October 17, 2011).
California Republican Party. 2011. “Standing Rules and Bylaws of the California Republican Party.” http://www.cagop.org/userfiles/file/Standing Rules and Bylaws 03-20-2011.pdf (October 17, 2011).
California Secretary of State. 2011a. “Political Party Qualification.” http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/elections_t.htm (October 17, 2011).
California Secretary of State. 2011b. “Initiative Guide.” http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/ballot-measures/initiative-guide.htm (October 17, 2011).
Center for Governmental Studies. 2008. Democracy by Initiative: Shaping California’s Fourth Branch of Government. 2nd ed. Los Angeles. http://www.cgs.org/images/publications/cgs_dbi_full_book_f.pdf (October 17, 2011).
Cronin, Thomas E. 1989. Direct Democracy: The Politics of Initiative, Referendum, and Recall. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Donovan, Todd, and Shaun Bowler. 1998. “Responsive or Responsible Government?” In Citizens as Legislators: Direct Democracy in the American States, eds. Shaun Bowler, Todd Donovan and Caroline Tolbert. Columbus: Ohio State University Press.
Lupia, Arthur. 1994. “Shortcuts versus Encyclopedias: Information and Voting Behavior in California Insurance Reform Elections.” American Political Science Review 88 (1): 63–76. http://www-personal.umich.edu/~lupia/Papers/Lupia1994_ShortcutsEncyclopedias.pdf (October 17, 2011).
Mathews, Joe, and Mark Paul. 2010. California Crackup: How Reform Broke the Golden State and How We Can Fix It. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Matsusaka, John G. 2005. “A Rolling Snowball of Direct Democracy.” Los Angeles Time, 15 June, B13.
Reynolds, Andrew, Ben Reilly, and Andrew Ellis. 2005. Electoral System Design: The New International IDEA Handbook. Stockholm: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance. http://www.idea.int/publications/esd/upload/ESD_Handb_low.pdf (October 17, 2011).
Sabato, Larry J., and Bruce A. Larson. 2002. The Party’s Just Begun: Shaping Political Parties for America’s Future. 2nd ed. New York: Longman.
Tolbert, Caroline J., Daniel H. Lowenstein, and Todd Donovan. 1998. “Election Law and Rules for Using Initiatives.” In Citizens as Legislators: Direct Democracy in the American States, eds. Shaun Bowler, Todd Donovan and Caroline Tolbert. Columbus: Ohio State University Press.
 While parties send out slate mailers informing members of their endorsements, voters often also receive mailers designed to mislead them into believing a party has endorsed a campaign it has not (Center for Governmental Studies 2008).
 Although critics of direct democracy often contrast voters’ decision-making ability with that of professional lawmakers, this is a distinction without a difference: “Propositions are often long and complicated, and surveys show that most citizens don’t read them in detail. Instead, voters rely on what political scientists call ‘information cues’ – advice from sources they trust, including family and friends, the media and political leaders. This might seem like cheating, but it’s really no different than what legislators do. Last year, the [California] Legislature sent the governor about 1,200 bills. You can be sure most lawmakers didn’t read much of what they voted on, but instead relied on advice from sources they trust” (Matsusaka 2005).
 Supporters dispute these claims, arguing that gridlock or instability in PR legislatures is rare (Amy 2000; 2002).
 California’s requirements for participating in a primary election are the same as those for qualifying a new political party listed in note 11. Six parties currently meet these requirements: American Independent, Democratic, Green, Libertarian, Peace and Freedom, and Republican (California Secretary of State 2011a). While applied here to California, MDD could easily be adapted to any other state’s current, or future, initiative process.
 Initiative sponsors in California have the option to request assistance from the state’s legislative counsel in drafting their proposals (Cal. Gov’t Code § 10243).
 Parties would be required to pay a filing fee for each proposal submitted. California’s current filing fee of $200, which is refunded if the initiative qualifies for the ballot, does not cover the costs incurred by the state to title and summarize each measure (Center for Governmental Studies 2008). To accurately reflect these costs, and to ensure that the extra burden imposed on the Attorney General’s office by MDD would not impede the processing of nonparty initiatives, I recommend a nonrefundable filing fee of $2,000 (Ibid.) for each new proposal submitted. If a party resubmitted one of its unsuccessful initiatives from a prior election, and the Attorney General determined that any minor changes made to it did not warrant a new title and summary, a new filing fee would not be assessed.
 The number of initiatives a party could include on its list would be limited to the maximum that could potentially be qualified for the general election ballot. Since parties’ lists would be closed, any influence voters might wish to have on a list’s order would need to be exercised through their party’s chosen process for forming it.
 A deadline would be set, prior to the printing of the general election ballot pamphlet, for each party’s state central committee to submit its endorsements to the Secretary of State. All the information typically provided for initiatives in the pamphlet, including supporting and opposing arguments and their full text, would be included for parties’ proposals, along with any party endorsements received.
 The option for parties to endorse each other’s initiatives is an essential component of MDD. It is similar to the process following PR elections when parties’ legislative delegations attempt to form a majority coalition. From among the broad range of ideas debated during campaigns, coalition members adopt those policies they can agree on (Amy 2000; 2002). With MDD, parties would use the primary election to express their policy positions – just as parties in PR countries do during campaigns – and their endorsements to show areas of agreement with other parties. Without such endorsements, it may be difficult for any party – major or minor – to gain the majority support from voters its initiatives would eventually need for passage.
 Sponsors attempting to qualify a statutory initiative in California have 150 days to collect 504,760 signatures (5% of the total votes cast for all gubernatorial candidates in 2010) (California Secretary of State 2011b). They face the additional challenge of gathering 25% to 50% more signatures than the required minimum to replace those found to be invalid (Tolbert, Lowenstein, and Donovan 1998).
 A political party can qualify in California through any of the following methods: “(a) if at the last preceding gubernatorial election there was polled for any one of its candidates for any office voted on throughout the state, at least 2 percent of the entire vote of the state, (b) if on or before the 135th day before any primary election, …voters equal in number to at least 1 percent of the entire vote of the state at the last preceding gubernatorial election have declared their intention to affiliate with that party, (c) if…there is filed with the Secretary of State a petition signed by voters, equal in number to at least 10 percent of the entire vote of the state at the last preceding gubernatorial election, declaring that they represent a proposed party” (Cal. Elec. Code, Div. 5, Chap. 2, § 5100). As there were 10,300,392 ballots cast in the 2010 gubernatorial election, party qualification currently requires 103,004 voter registrations (California Secretary of State 2011a).
 Regulations confining initiatives to a single subject – such as Article II, Section 8(d) of the California Constitution – may complicate the conversion of parties’ multifaceted economic programs into ballot measures. For example, an initiative might be prevented from both cutting taxes and offsetting the cuts with an alternative revenue source (Donovan and Bowler 1998). With MDD, any party that could reasonably expect to qualify at least two initiatives for the general election ballot – each containing a provision making its enactment conditional on the passage of the other – could overcome this disadvantage of the single-subject rule by ranking these complementary proposals consecutively at or near the top of its list.